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Even after more then ten years after the beginning of the transition process, Russian agriculture 
shows only limited sign of a recovery. Production has not reached the level of the pre-transition period 
and investment is still on a very low level. In this paper we use the “Theory of Induced Innovation” in 
order to access the development of production structures in Russia and to identify the major obstacles 
for restructuring. We argue that due to multiple market failure (capital, labour) and inappropriate insti-
tutional arrangements inherited from Soviet times hinder the development of Russian agriculture. Both 
reasons causes that agricultural enterprises have difficulties with regard to an adjustment of factor 
input and production corresponding to the real scarcities of production factors. Agricultural policies 
based on subsidizing factor use or minimum prices will be an inefficient approach to solve the prob-
lems. A promising approach instead would be encouraging market transactions and fostering the inte-
gration of agricultural enterprises in the regional and domestic factor and product markets. 
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More than ten years after the beginning of transition there are still limited signs of a recovery of 
Russian agriculture. Moreover, the sector did not participate in the general upswing of the Russian 
economy during the last years (Voigt, 2005). Several economic and institutional factors responsible for 
this stagnation have been identified. Already during Soviet times agriculture was the Achilles heel of 
the economy. Compared to the non-agricultural part of the economy the creation of competitive farm 
enterprises progressed only slowly during the 1990s. No sector of the economy showed such a stiff 
resistance against reforms. As a consequence, low profitability and productivity of the agricultural 
sector result in an inferior position in the hard competition with other branches of the economy for 
capital and labour forces (Svetlov, 2003), managerial and technological skills are still lacking in agri-
culture (Serova, 2000). Additionally, the decline of rural areas accompanied by severe social problems 
and a massive rural migration deteriorate the local social and economic environment of agricultural 
enterprises (Uzun et al., 1999). An unstable and unpredictable political and legal environment within 
regions and concerning the relations of regions to the federal government aggravate the existing prob-
lems further and obstruct any solution (Serova, 2000). Especially agriculture is subjected to far reach-
ing non-coordinated interventions of regional and local authorities (Kopsidis, 2000). Beside these fun-
damental defaults many problems which could be redressed in the short run obstruct the recovery of 
Russian agriculture as well. Among them a lack of short term capital (Svetlov, 2003; Epstein, Tillack, 
1999), machinery (Zinchenko, 2001), labour, livestock and other important inputs have to be men-
tioned. Mainly particular frictions in input flows heavily disturb the necessary constant supply of re-
sources to maintain production within farm enterprises. Poorly developed specific market institutions 
even 15 years after transition has started, a lack of infrastructure or just a shortage of particular re-
sources available to other sectors are responsible for this precarious problem.  
Our paper extends former analyses by taking a more explicit look at the mutual interdependence 
between institutional environment and production techniques. Not only a lack of capital goods but also 
the choice of unsuited technology not adjusted to the given factor price relations can cause growth 
reducing inefficiencies reinforcing stagnation in agriculture. Most of the recent literature concerning 
Russia implicitly assumes that high technology is always most efficient and necessary for inducing 
growth in Russian agriculture. This widespread view ignores completely the experiences of develop-
ing countries and the vast empirical and theoretical literature dealing with questions of appropriate 
technology to induce growth focusing on relative factor supplies and prices. After 40 years of experi-
 2ences and research it is quite clear that the use of capital intensive, labour saving high technology in an 
underdeveloped agriculture operating under the conditions of excessive capital cost and low wages 
like in Russia results in severe sectoral and macroeconomic efficiency losses and stagnated growth. A 
malfunctioning institutional framework and poor infrastructure leading to non functioning factor and 
capital markets further aggravates economic stagnation (Meier, 1995). 
Hayami and Ruttan showed in their Theory of Induced Innovation that depending on factor and 
product price relations diverse kinds of technical change, technologies, and institutions are necessary 
to realize agricultural growth in a most efficient way. There is no technology that fits for every econ-
omy as early development economics had assumed taking the USA and Europe as models for all de-
veloping economies completely ignoring the very different factor price relations (Hayami, Ruttan, 
1985). The breakdown of the kolkhoz-system with its heavily mechanized extremely subsidized tech-
nology during the early 1990s urgently puts the question on the agenda whether under the condition of 
high capital costs and low wages a capital intensive labour saving agricultural technology is really 
appropriate to promote the recovery of Russian agriculture as many Russian and Western experts be-
lieve.  
An application of Hayami and Ruttan’s theory will deepen our understanding of the severe transi-
tion crisis significantly and help to explain the slow recovery of Russian agriculture. Within this con-
text, we will  
•  identify the mechanisms how institutional frictions in Russia influence the choice of technol-
ogy and the adoption of technological changes, 
•  assess the adverse consequences for efficiency in agricultural production and  
•  derive policy recommendations helping to bring technical change into a closer relation to rela-
tive factor supplies and prices. 
The paper is organized as follows: The next section provides information about the development 
of agricultural production and factor use within Russia. Since according to the theory of induced inno-
vation relative factor prices are essential for the choice of techniques special emphasize is provided to 
factor proportions. In Chapter 3 the theoretical approach will be presented. Chapter 4 discusses the 
development in Russian agriculture in the light of the theoretical consideration. Inefficiencies resulting 
from the choice of inappropriate techniques and the reasons for this suboptimal behaviour are ana-
lyzed. However, since an assessment of the production structure is only possible when reference sys-
tems are available, the factor intensities will be compared to those in Europe and the US. The last 
chapter discusses policy options aiming at agricultural and rural development. 
 
2. Production and factor use in Russian Agriculture 
 
2.1. Agricultural production  
 
Figure 1 provides information about the changes of agricultural output. Crop as well as animal 
production dropped significantly as a consequence of the macro-economic instabilities resulting from 
the Russian crisis in 1998. Moreover, there is only a slow recovery in recent years. However, this de-
velopment is surprising, because the crisis was accompanied by a drastic devaluation of the Russian 
Rouble. It could have been expected that the increase in import prices and the higher competitiveness 
of Russian exports would have induced higher production incentives. However, the fact that these 
price incentives on the macro-level were not transferred to agriculture indicates that other factors exist 
which hampered the recovery in this sector. 
The changes of agricultural production by farm type is given in Figure 2. Corporate farms are the 
successors of the former kolkhoz. This group is characterized by large scale enterprises cultivating 
several thousand hectares. Private farms, on the other hand, show an extremely heterogeneous struc-
ture stretching from household plot production to family farms like in the West and some few large 
farms in individual ownership
1.  
 
                                                      
1 This heterogeneity makes it nearly impossible to interpret statistical data concerning private farming. It only 
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Figure 1:  Total agricultural production in prices of 2000. 
Source:  Goskomstat, 2002, own calculations. 
 
Presently the share of corporate farms in crop production is about 40%. In 1998 the share 
dropped, however, it reached again relatively fast the level of the period before the crises. The pattern 
for animal production is different. Large-scale animal production was reduced significantly before 
1998. Animal production in corporate farms dropped dramatically until 1998, since then the share 
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Figure 2:  Agricultural production by farm type. 
Source:  Goskomstat, 2002, own calculations. 
 
However, not only because of serious uncertainties in the data concerning private farming it 
makes sense to concentrate on corporate farms. The extremely big share of household plot production 
is a result mainly of the impoverishment of many groups of the Russian population in the course of the 
transition crisis and of lacking wage funds in agricultural enterprises. This kind of subsistence econ-
omy did not expand on functioning markets due to its competitiveness compared to other forms of 
farm enterprises. Russian subsistence agriculture on household plots rather represents a consequence 
of economic crisis and indicates the lack of a functioning market economy (Seeth et. al., 1998).  
The future of Russian agriculture mainly depends on the adjustment of corporate farms whose 
size may allow the realization of economies of scale. If the creation of competitive corporate farms 
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Figure 3:  Factor shares in agriculture (corporate farms only) 
Source:  Goskomstat, 2002, own calculations. 
 
2.1. Factor use 
 
Figure 3 represents changes in the cost of agricultural production. The data cover the develop-
ment in large-scale enterprises, only. Remuneration of labour showed with about 20% a relatively 
constant share in factor costs. The main changes between 1995 and 2001 concern capital costs and 
material inputs. From 1995 to 2001 the cost of capital decreased significantly. In 2001 this segment 
accounts for less than 5% of total costs. On the contrary, material cost (seed and fertilizer, fuel and 
energy, fodder) increased relatively strong from about 55% to more than 70%. Within this group espe-
cially purchased material inputs increased their share. The stake of fodder, an input that to a large ex-
tent produced by the sector itself, remains constant. 
 
Table 1: Factor input in agriculture  
 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  labour  total  (m  workers)  9.7 9.3 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.4 7.9 
  -  corporate  farms  (%)  69 67 66 61 60 56 53 
  -  private  farming  (%)  31 33 34 39 40 44 47 
  land  total  (m  hectare)  209.6 208.4 206.2 195.2 197.6  197 195.9 
  -  corporate  farms  (%)  82 81 80 84 82 80 79 
  -  private  farming  (%)  18 19 20 16 18 20 21 
  capital #  of  tractors  (1000)  1052.1 966.1 911.4 856.7 786.8 746.7 697.7 
  materials  fertilizer  (m  tons)  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 
Source: Goskomstat (2002), own calculations. 
 
Factor shares do not allow identifying the forces driving the adjustment process, i.e. whether the 
development is caused by changes in prices or quantities. However, some general features can be de-
duced. Constant production and an increase in the share of purchased material inputs indicate that this 
rise is caused by price effects. Otherwise one would expect a growth of production. The decline of 
capital costs points to rather low investment activities in Russian agriculture. This view is confirmed 
by the increase in repair. With low investment the rate of replacement of machinery and equipment 
can be only relatively small. Consequently, the vintage of capital inputs increase. Corresponding with 
a higher operating life of the equipment the requirements regarding maintaining and repairs will in-
crease (Table 1).  
 
3. Induced innovation hypothesis 
5
   
According to the classification of Pavitt (1984) agriculture belongs to the supply dominated sec-
tors. Technological advances usually are process innovations developed in related industries (input 
supplier, processors). This feature requires that two aspects have to be taken into account. The first 
concerns creation of economic signals regarding research incentives and technology adoption (induced 
technological innovation). The second has to deal with the institutional arrangements allowing an effi-
cient transfer of the signals (induced institutional innovation).  
 
3.1. Induced technological innovation  
 
The theory of induced innovation was introduced in the early 1970s by Hayami and Ruttan
2. It 
stresses the significance of demand as the major source of research incentives. Ruttan (2001) admits 
that not all research should be considered as demand driven. Especially in basic research the supply 
push component may be considerable. However, the induced innovation hypothesis concerns mainly 
applied research, and thus, research activities conducted by private companies. Without an at least 
latent demand for new products, firms could not sell and no incentives for research exists. For exam-
ple, if imperfect factor- and capital markets cause a decline in effective demand investments in re-
search remain too low.  
Ahmad (1966) pioneered the microeconomics of induced innovations. He introduced many of the 
concepts of an innovation possibility curve (IPC) which is also central in the Hayami - Ruttan frame-
work. At a given time the state of knowledge defines a set of production techniques latently available. 
However, before a special technique can be applied, it has to be designed, i.e. resources have to be 
devoted to (applied) research and development (R&D). The IPC represents the envelope of these proc-
esses and thus, is a presentation of production techniques which may be generated with R&D. Accord-
ingly, the IPC shows larger possibilities of substitution among inputs than the individual techniques 
characterized by their isoquants. A change in the state of knowledge is equivalent to a shift in the IPC 
and the occurrence of new production possibilities. With given factor prices, the increase of knowl-
edge leads to generation of production techniques along a given trajectory (for instance labour inten-
sity). However, a change in factor prices does not only alter factor intensities along the production 
technique but will also lead to a change of the production process
3.  
Another theoretical background is constituted by the work of Herlemann and Stamer (1958) on 
agricultural development and farm size. Their basic conjecture is that countries specialize on those 
production techniques that uses abundant factors intensively
4. The scarcity of factors find their expres-
sion in relative prices. Moreover, since economic growth leads to a change in availability of inputs 
there is an ongoing change in factor price relations. This, in turn, induces adjustments of the produc-
tion processes applied. By making implicit use of the concepts employed in the induced innovation 
literature, Herlemann and Stamer were able to identify development trajectories for different initial 
factor endowments. In particular, they showed the development paths for countries with high and low 
land endowment. 
Equipped with this theoretical background the theory of induced technological innovation can be 
easily explained (Figure 4)
5. The axes of Figure 1 depict factor input: A, C, and L represent land, capi-
tal (equipment) and labour respectively. The initial production technology is given by isoquant y0. The 
                                                      
2 See Hayami and Ruttan (1985) 
3 The microeconmics of the induced innovation hypothesis where also formulated in Binswanger (1978) and 
Hockmann(1992). Both approaches use deterministic research technologies. Stochastic research results are 
considered in Hockmann (2001). 
4 Their approach represents an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. This approach 
states that countries specialize on the production of those goods which show the most intensive use of the 
abundant factor. 
5 The figure demonstrates labor-saving technologies. They are typical for countries with high land endowment. 
However, this kind of innovations can also occur in countries where land is scarce. For instance, economic 
growth leads to a high increase in the demand for labor accompanied by a strong increase of wages. Given a 
constant price of capital a substitution of labor by capital will happen. The scarcity of labor, in the interpreta-
tion of Herlemann and Stamer, implies the adoption of technologies which uses the relatively abundant factor 
intensively.  
 6IPC is the envelope of other production technologies which may exist latently. When the relation of 
land rents and wages is α the optimal production point is P or (L0, A0). An increase of wages leads to 
factor price relation β. With technology y0 cost minimization will change the optimal input mix to Q. 
Moving along the IPC curve allows for further reduction of production costs. The optimal production 
point is given where the rate of substitution of the IPC is equal to the factor shares (S or (L’, A’)). This 
point is associated with the choice of another production technique y’ which compared to y0 requires a 
lower amount of labour but more land input. Using more land per worker requires in general an in-
crease in machinery. Thus, land and capital are characterized by a complementary relationship (line M 
M’). 
At this point it has to be emphasized that the shift between the production techniques occurred 
without a change in the stock of knowledge. Since the availability of the technique is only latently 
available applied research is needed to realize the potentially available new technology on a given 
IPC. When the movement on the given IPC allows a larger saving on production cost as resources are 
devoted to research, the movement is beneficial from a social point of view. However, there exist 
other options that allow a switch. In an open economy technology may be exchanged either by exter-




























Figure 4:  Induced Technological Innovation (labour-saving). 
Source: adapted from Hayami, Ruttan (1985) 
 
In a dynamic environment the state of knowledge changes and a new IPC* emerges which now 
represents the latent available techniques. Given the requirements for production techniques which 
result from the new factor price relations, it is no longer profitable to conduct applied research along 
the trajectory implied by y0. Instead, the optimal choice would be to improve the technologies repre-
sented by y’. In the figure it is assumed that applied R&D produces a technique y* with optimal factor 
combination (A*, L*, C*). However, because this trajectory is adjusted to the change in factor price 
relation, one can assume that all will benefit from technological advances. In the figure, it is assumed 
that complementary relationship between land and capital did not change. Thus land and capital bene-
fit from the increased state of knowledge proportionally.  
7
  The central element guiding an efficient development are relative prices. Malfunctioning markets 
as a result of policy interventions or a poorly developed institutional framework and infrastructure 
often set incentives in a direction that decisions of farmers and related industries will not be guided by 
the correct signals. Retarded growth accruing from an inefficient factor use are the consequences. Fur-
thermore, from a social point of view malfunctioning factor and credit markets lead to a choice of 
inefficient techniques between a set of given technologies and technology adoption will not be guided 
by social factor scarcities. This points to the institutional aspect induced innovations. 
 
3.2. Induced institutional innovation 
 
The “institutional” part of the induced innovation hypothesis relies on the conjecture that techno-
logical change induce imbalances in the economic relations between individuals. The discrepancies 
create a demand for institutional innovation which together with the supply of institutions, i.e., their 
availability, establishes a new equilibrium.  
Demand for institutional change is driven by two factors (Ruttan 1978): 
•  the change of factor scarcity with economic development 
•  the changes in income streams and income distribution resulting from technological change. 
The result of these factors is the emergence of new property rights structures, more efficient mar-
ket structures, contractual arrangements or non-market institutions. Their common feature is that these 
innovations offer the possibility for a more efficient use of resources compared to the pre-innovative 
period (Hayami, Ruttan, 1985). Examples in this direction are agrarian reforms enforcing full property 
rights on land; non market institutions like public research institutes and contractual arrangements like 
the foundation of unions as a reaction on exploitation of labour. 
The supply of institutional innovations depend on the fact whether it is possible to mobilise corre-
sponding political resources. Mobilisation of political resources incurs costs. Thus, decision makers 
will be only willing to implement or accept a new regulation when the costs are smaller than expected 
outcome. Clearly, institutional innovation will be the easier and the faster the lower the resource costs 
and the higher the benefits for decision makers. Culture including ideology and religious traditions 
will have a considerable influence on the supply of institutions. These features influence in particular 
the cost of institutional changes. Other things constant, new regulations will be adopted faster when 
they are closely related and comparable to the existing institutional and cultural environment of a soci-
ety (North, 1992, Feldmann, 1999). A further impact on innovation supply may result from advances 
in social sciences. Knowledge about the effects and causes of institutional arrangements can be used to 
substitute cost intensive “trial and error” processes. Whether the arrangements will increase or de-
crease welfare depends on the institution itself and on the influence of innovation-supporting interest 
groups.
6 However, the problem is to identify institutional arrangements providing incentives for agri-
cultural producers which are in accordance with the scarcity of production factors and the social factor 
price relations (shadow prices). Otherwise efficiency losses and stagnation are the consequences.  
 
                                                      
6 Especially rent seeking behavior may result in welfare losses. Providing quotas, licenses or price support usu-
ally creates distorted incentives which lead to a suboptimal allocation of resources from an economic point of 
view. 
 84. Russian agriculture in the light of the Induced Innovation theory 
 
This section discusses the empirical observations discussed in chapter 2 with regard to the in-
duced innovation hypothesis. We presume a constant return to scale technology, a simplifying as-
sumption that nevertheless appears to be well suited for Russian agriculture. It is claimed that one of 
the advantages of Russian agriculture are significant economies of scale realized by large agricultural 
holdings. However, Voigt (2005) estimate that economies of scale in Russian agriculture are only 
slightly above one. The assumption of constant returns to scale allows a normalisation of labour and 
land use in corporate and private farming by the amount of production and to derive the unit isoquant 
(in 1000 Roubles in figure 5). In addition, we suppose that during the period of investigation techno-
logical change had no significant impact on agricultural production possibilities
7. 
According to our results production on Russian private farms is relatively labour intensive. Addi-
tionally, private farms use less labour and less land to produce one unit of output than corporate farms. 
This on the first sight astonishing result suggests that these farms operate more efficient than corporate 
farms.
8 Moreover, according to this outcome private farms seem to define the IPC for Russian agricul-
ture. Assuming free disposability and convexity, the IPC is simply given by a parallel line to the axis 
in the figure. The figure also provides that corporate farming is not technically efficient. These farms 
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Figure 5:  Factor intensities and technology in Russian agriculture 
Source:  Goskomstat (2002), own calculations. 
 
Beside analyzing differences in technical efficiency between private and corporate farming we 
want to look which kind of production technologies is adjusted more appropriate to the factor scarci-
ties in Russia. Answering this requires to investigate the capital, land and labour market. Land markets 
in Russia are still underdeveloped. Although, agricultural land is in private ownership the possibilities 
of land transfer are rather limited. Since purchase of agricultural land is still prohibited by law, the 
only mode of exchange of land is by leasing arrangements. As experiences in Western Europe show, 
these arrangements could well lead to a transfer of land to the most efficient producers. Thus, it can be 
                                                      
7 This assumption corresponds also with empirical observations. See Voigt (2005). 
8 However, this statement has to be interpreted rather carefully. It has been mentioned above, that statistical 
information about private farming is by far not as reliable as for corporate farming. In particular, there exist 
only limited and questionable data on farm size and labour input. Given these restrictions, the results for private 
farms allow only a very uncertain approximation to the existing production technology. However, rough esti-
mates are possible. The differences to corporate farms are quite large. This suggests that our general conclu-
sions regarding the differences and the efficiency of production technologies hold. 
9
  expected that the situation on the land market will not lead directly to a distortion in factor input. 
Moreover land cannot be regarded as a scarce factor in Russian agricultural production. 
However, the fact that property rights are not strongly defined has a consequence for the capital 
market. Because of their difficult situation, corporate farms need credits to conduct their investment 
plans. The infeasibility to contract on all future contingencies creates the possibility to gain from op-
portunistic behaviour. Thus, an adverse selection problem exists that hampers the development of the 
capital market. In Western countries, this problem is usually circumvented by using agricultural land 
as the collateral. However, this mechanism can only be adopted, when property rights on land are well 
defined. A failure in this respect will lead to credit rationing and a suboptimal capital input from a 
social point of view. In addition, on the supply side a poorly developed rural credit system restricts the 
functioning of the capital market (Csaki et. al., pp.79). Thus, an industrialised economy like the Rus-
sian is only provided with a malfunctioning capital market more typically for underdeveloped coun-
tries. This problem concerns corporate as well as private farms. However, the latter cultivate only 
small plot on which a substitution of capital by labour is technically relatively easy. 
The impact of the malfunctioning capital market on agriculture can be seen in Table 2. The Rus-
sian statistics provide no information about the aggregate productive agricultural capital stock. Thus, 
we approximated capital input by the number of tractors used in agricultural production. Between 
1995 and 2001 capital input decreased significantly as indicated by the reduction of the number of 
tractors by more than 30%. During this period, investment in agriculture remained mainly constant, 
however, it reached only 3-4% of agricultural output.
9 The constant shrinking of the capital stock in 
agriculture since 1990 mainly affects the highly mechanized corporate farms.  
 
Table 2: Capital and financial structure of investment capital  
 
    1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 capital  # of tractors (in 1000)  1052.1  966.1  911.4  856.7  786.8  746.7  697.7 
in m Rouble, prices of 2000  37285  28719  29658  29460  23304  31442  32300   investment 
share  of  production  (%)  4.6 3.8 3.3 4.0 3.2 4.1 3.9 
equity  capital  56.3 64.6 63.3 71.8 59.8 67.1 77.4 
debt  43.7 35.4 36.7 28.2 40.2 32.9 22.6 
  of that government  30.6  22.5  20.9  9.2  6.6  8.5  5.6 
   of that federal budget  16.8  10  9  3.4  3  3.9  2 
 financial  
structure 
   of that regional budget  13.8  12.5  11.9  5.5  3.2  4.3  3.4 
Source: Goskomstat (2002), own calculations. 
 
The table also reveals that equity capital is the main source of investment. Moreover, its share in-
creased between 1995 and 2001 by about 20 percent points to 75%. The decreasing importance of debt 
in investment financing is mainly the result of a withdrawal of public means. Both, the share of the 
federal as well as the regional governments decreased from one third to an almost marginal amount. 
Within the whole period, the financial sources provided by banks and private institutions remain 
roughly constant. The private non-agricultural sector provided only 15-20% of the investment capital. 
With regard to our theoretical considerations these figures present a good illustration of the impact of 
capital market imperfections on agriculture. 
Rural labour markets are also poorly developed. Seven decades of socialism in the former Soviet 
Union have created a complex mix of formal and informal institutions, that certainly had an impact on 
the subjective models of the economic agents in post-soviet Russia that determine today’s institutional 
choices. Before 1990, labour input was not determined by profit maximization. In addition, farms were 
also obliged to provide the infrastructure within the rural areas. This, however, concerns not only 
transport facilities or medical care a. o. m. but also the provision of jobs for the rural population 
(Koester 2003). The lack of economic pressures to adjust the institutional environment in rural areas 
                                                      
9 However, even this share is insufficient to keep capital input (in financial terms) constant. For example, Ger-
man figures could be found in BMVEL (2002). In Western Europe more than 10% of gross output is reinvested 
into agriculture. 
 10together with the inertia of informal institutions (North 1992) has caused a significant hidden unem-
ployment on corporate farms. Moreover, the institutional settings prevent the release of labour. Often, 
only the complete failure of such a farm leads to the necessary adjustment processes. Through this, 
managers are only endowed with limited possibilities to create incentive compatible labour input, and 
thus, to solve the principle agent problem regarding labour input (Hockmann et al. 2003). Further-
more, because of the fact that a strong labour demand of the non-agricultural sectors does not occur 
the low real wages in agriculture are not under pressure to increase. Indeed, no intersectional competi-
tion pushing up the rural wage level does exist. 
To sum up, multiple market failure is responsible for the unsatisfactory performance of most 
large farm enterprises in Russia. One important reason for the better performance of private farms 
could perhaps be seen in their capability to adapt easier to the adverse conditions of inefficient factor 
markets, the lack of functioning distribution channels and malfunctioning capital markets compared to 
highly mechanized underfinanced corporate farms depending on wage labour and a constant supply of 
non agricultural inputs. The adverse conditions of an extreme case of multiple market failure charac-
terize Russian agriculture during the whole transition crisis since 1990. However, the overwhelming 
difficulties of large scale farms to survive under the conditions of non-functioning markets says noth-
ing about their future competitiveness after the transition crisis will be overcome.  
Under the conditions of multiple market failures on factor and credit markets which severely ob-
struct any intersectional flow of inputs and goods essential for any kind of modern farming and having 
in mind the missing self interest of rural wage labourers the transaction costs of family labour are 
much lower than for wage estates especially in labour intensive animal production stronger depending 
on inputs like fodder produced on the farm. All in all, family farms can adjust much better to multiple 
market failure which often prevails in the agriculture of developing countries. According to all experi-
ences of developing countries showing only poorly functioning factor and capital markets lower trans-
action costs of family farms generally more than offset advantages of more capital intensive large es-
tates even if the latter are preferred by governmental agricultural policy for example through special 
credit subsidies (H.P. Binswanger et. al., 1995). Such programs favouring large farms occurred in 
Russia as well. 
Whereas the low rate of investment and insufficient replacement of machinery and equipment in 
Russian agriculture is discussed extensively in the literature the suitability of Russian machinery im-
ports to the prevailing economic conditions has never been discussed. Implicitly nearly all Western as 
well as Russian experts seem to assume that expensive high technology presents the optimal solution 
for building up the capital stock in Russian agriculture. This fixation on high technology was one of 
the big mistakes of early development policy during the 1950s and 1960s channelling a huge amount 
of limited resources into the purchase of expensive capital goods for agriculture. Countries which have 
followed this kind of development strategy paid a high price for their mistake. General economic 
growth slowed down, relatively abundant factors in agriculture –mainly labour- stayed unemployed 
and rural migration soared. To sum it up, stagnation and fast spreading rural poverty were the conse-
quences of a capital intense developing path completely ignoring the relative factor scarcities and 
prices of poor countries (Saith, 1990). Having these experiences in mind it makes sense for Russia to 
ask whether the increasing import of modern Western agricultural technology really contributes to a 
solution of the lasting stagnation of Russian agriculture and what the reasons are that an agricultural 
technology better adjusted to Russian conditions, which is indeed produced within the country by do-
mestic or foreign suppliers, does not penetrate the Russian market. 
The theory of induced innovation, often proved by extensive empirical research, can contribute a 
lot to answer these vital questions for Russian agriculture. Figure 6 shows the differences of land and 
labour productivity as well as land-man ratios for Russia, Germany and the USA. The latter two coun-
tries show higher labour as well as land productivities. Furthermore, Germany and the USA are highly 
developed countries with intense exchange of goods and technology. This suggests that agriculture in 
both countries operates on the same IPC. However, since population density in Germany is relatively 
high, it is a typical example of a country applying land saving technologies. The USA which, on the 
other hand, has only a low population density uses technologies that are more labour saving.  
The fact that corporate farms as well as private farms in Russia do not reach the productivity lev-
els of the other two countries points out that Russian agriculture is operating on a different IPC. Tak-
ing the land labour relationship as an indicator of the kind of machinery to be applied the data suggest 
11
  that Russian agriculture should orientate on the German specialisation in technologies.
10 However, 
pursuing this strategy is questionable, since the stage of development and thus the relative factor scar-
cities of the German and the Russian economy are very different. Because of the high cost of labour, 
agricultural technology in Germany has both, land saving and labour saving characteristics. In com-
parison, the cost of labour in Russia is very low. This calls for a relative labour intense technology. 
Moreover, the input structure in Russian agriculture is biased by the malfunctioning of the capital 
market and the burden of social functions that have to be financed by agricultural enterprises. Both 
effects induce a technology with relative high labour input to absorb excess labour. Thus, it has to be 
concluded, that neither modern German nor the US technology is appropriate for Russian agriculture. 
Rather, Russian enterprises should look for technologies that were applied in both countries before the 






































Note:  - - - , ___  labour productivity equals to 10000, 10000 $US/worker, respectively
 
 
Figure 6:  Partial productivities in Russian agriculture and selected Western countries 1995-2001. 
Source:  Goskomstat (2002), Eurostat(1996ff.) and USDA (1996ff, own calculation. 
 
Having the special Russian situation in mind characterised by stiff agricultural labour markets 
and restricted capital markets a growing import of expensive, capital intense, labour saving Western 
technology will not contribute to improve poor efficiency of corporate farms. Moreover, the excess of 
labour would further increase. In addition, the historical experience of highly developed Western 
countries (USA, Europe, Japan) clearly shows, that from an macro and micro economic point of view 
the diffusion of labour saving, highly capital intensive agricultural technology only has paid from a 
very late moment on: in Europe after 1950 and in Japan after 1970 in the course of the long post war 
boom. Only in a situation of a long lasting speeding up of real wages accompanied by strongly dimin-
ishing capital costs high technology makes a sense to maintain a profitable agriculture (Y. Hayami / T. 
Kawagoe, 1989).  
                                                      
10 Actually there exists some technology import from Germany and other European countries. This concerns 
equipment for plant (harvesters, tractors,…) as well as for animal (milk machines, …) production. The tech-
nologies became mainly available by international co-operations of domestic and foreign agribusiness enter-
prises or by provision of financial means by domestic non-agricultural enterprises. In the latter case the compa-
nies take over control of the farms. See Hockmann et. al. (2003). 
11 The significance of this problem becomes evident when recognizing the changes which are connected with 
modern technologies, if applied to Russian agriculture. Often, the most labour saving devices are dismantled in 
order to employ the existing labour force on the farm. 
 12The Russian situation differs fundamentally from the post war boom 1950-1973 of the Western 
world. Moreover, the Russian economy suffered a deep transition crisis after 1990 and even if some 
signs of recovery occurred during the last years Russia’s economy presently does not experience a 
starting boom phase. Factor price relations in Russian agriculture have changed fundamentally after 
1990. Capital costs soared whereas labour costs stayed constant or decreased. All in all relative factor 
prices have changed in favour of labour – quite the opposite of what has happened in post war Europe. 
Thus nothing speaks in favour of expensive Western machinery imports to enhance efficiency of Rus-
sian large farms. What indeed urgently is needed, is a technology considering the relative factor scar-
cities in Russia’s agriculture. This would also help to reduce the labour excess on Russian farms and 
simultaneously foster efficiency and profitability. 
This kind of technology already is available within Russia either produced by domestic or foreign 
enterprises manufacturing in Russia. If capital market failure could be redressed and the emergence of 
integrated domestic factor markets would be supported a much better adjusted farm technology could 
be distributed all over Russia enhancing the productivity and profitability of Russian agriculture. One 
additional important reason that many corporate farms obviously ignore the changed factor price rela-
tions and thus aggravate the consequences of further capital shortage could be that there exists a strong 
path dependency for capital intensive technology among the decision makers of Russian agriculture as 
a Soviet heritage. In fact, many corporate farms benefit from governmental credit subsidies but mainly 
two reasons restrict the effectiveness of credit subsidies to replenish the agricultural capital stock. 
First, inappropriate technology has been purchased and, second, malfunctioning domestic factor mar-
kets impede the sufficient supply of better suited Russian technology. 
 
5. Policy recommendations and further research 
 
The restructuring of Russian agriculture still needs a lot of time and much more resources have to 
be devoted to it. Due to the fact that Russian technology which is better adjusted to the existing rela-
tive factor costs is still available present agricultural policy should focus on impediments disturbing 
the distribution of existing appropriate Russian technology within the own domestic market. The for-
mation of highly integrated domestic markets for agricultural inputs has to be enforced by the federal 
government against all odds created by regional authorities. Only, if domestic distribution channels are 
reliable, Russian farmers are not compelled to rely on imports. Well functioning capital markets would 
be a great support to accelerate the necessary integration process within Russia. Three areas offer a 
promising potential for successful policy measures: 
•  Better access to the capital market through the creation of publicly founded agricultural 
banks to supply promising corporate farms with the necessary finance. 
•  To remove all restrictions on domestic factor markets created by regional authorities. 
•  To support public research in developing new agricultural technology well adjusted to the 
needs of medium and larger Russian farms.    
However, to develop a successful strategy for replenishing the capital stock in agriculture it is ab-
solutely necessary to take into consideration that the Russian Federation contains very different devel-
oped regions (Voigt 2005). Thus, a regionally differentiated strategy of technological and institutional 
change is demanded. Further research on these points is urgently demanded. A second important fea-
ture of Russian rural regions represents the massive rural migration in many Russian regions. Thus, 
the reasons for this significant rural exodus which are very different to developing countries and its 
impact on Russian agricultural labour markets also has to be considered to adjust the analysis better to 
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